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ABSTRACT: The replicability of experiment is routinely offered as the gold standard of evidence. I argue that it is not sup-
ported by a universal principle of replicability in inductive logic. A failure of replication may not impugn a credi-
ble experimental result; and a successful replication can fail to vindicate an incredible experimental result. Rather, 
employing a material approach to inductive inference, the evidential import of successful replication of an exper-
iment is determined by the prevailing background facts. Commonly, these background facts do support success-
ful replication as a good evidential guide and this has fostered the illusion of a deeper, exceptionless principle.
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RESUMEN: La replicabilidad de los experimentos se presenta de modo rutinario como la regla de oro de la evidencia. De-
fenderé que no está apoyada por un principio universal de replicabilidad en la lógica inductiva. El fracaso en la 
replicación puede que no impugne un resultado experimental creíble;  y una replicación exitosa puede fallar a 
la hora de vindicar un resultado experimental increíble. En contra, y según un enfoque material de la inferen-
cia inductiva, el valor evidencial de la replicación exitosa de un experimento está determinado por los hechos de 
fondo prevalecientes. Por lo general, estos hechos apoyan la replicación exitosa como una buena guía evidencial, 
y esto ha generado la ilusión de que existe un principio más profundo y sin excepciones. 
Palabras clave: experiment, repetibilidad, replicabilidad, reproducibilidad.
1. Preamble
In papers (Norton 2003, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2014, manuscript) and in a book manuscript in 
preparation, I have defended a material theory of induction. Its principal idea is that induc-
tive inferences are not warranted by conformity with some universal schema of a formal in-
ductive logic. Here, I claim, inductive inference is unlike deductive inference, as commonly 
developed. Rather, inductive inferences are warranted by facts. For example, the statistical 
fact that most winters are snowy authorizes us to infer that there will be snow next winter.
How can facts authorize inferences? It is easy to see how it can happen with deductive 
inference. The deduction from A to B can be warranted by the hypothetical fact “If A then 
B.” If we accept that the meaning of the “if…then…” connective is enough to enable the hy-
pothetical fact to warrant the inference, then we have the deductive analog of the material 
approach to induction.1
*  My thanks to Allan Franklin and Slobodan Perovic for their assistance and encouragement.
1  The formal alternative is to insist that in addition we need some universal schema that says: If A and “If 
A then B,” then B.
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The facts that authorize an inductive inference are contingent and thus obtain only in 
restricted domains. Hence the material approach entails that there are no successful, uni-
versal, formal schema of inductive inference. In making the case for the material approach 
in the papers mentioned, I have sought to demonstrate that none of the familiar schema or 
principles has universal validity. These include the accounts favored at one time or another 
by philosophers: enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, Bayesian confir-
mation theory and more.
For an inductive inference to be properly warranted, the proposition that warrants it 
must be true. This truth is commonly assumed tacitly. I will continue to describe these war-
ranting propositions as “facts” to reflect this tacit assumption and also to underscore their 
contingent character.
This paper is part of that larger project. While the schema favored by philosophers fail 
to be universal, this paper asks whether such a principle can be found in the explicit lore of 
practicing scientists.
2. Introduction: The Replicability of Experiment
The general idea is simple and instantly compelling. If an experimental result has succeeded 
in revealing a real process or effect, then that success should be replicated when the experi-
ment is done again, whether it is done by the same experimenter in the same lab (“repeata-
bility”) or by others, elsewhere, using equivalent procedures (“reproducibility”).
One readily finds enthusiastic endorsements of the idea in the scientific literature. The 
opening sentence of a special section in Science on “Data Replication and Reproducibility” 
says (Jasny et al, 2011): “Replication—the confirmation of results and conclusions from 
one study obtained independently in another—is considered the scientific gold standard.” 
An editorial in Infection and Immunity on “Reproducible Science” begins its abstract with 
an unequivocal: “The reproducibility of an experimental result is a fundamental assump-
tion in science.” (Casadevall and Fang, 2010, 4972) There are few if any doubts about the 
notion. The principal locus of concern is that replication can be hard to achieve, either be-
cause of the difficulty of replicating pertinent conditions or through lack of institutional 
rewards to the replicating experimenters.
My concern in this paper is inductive logic. Might replicability provide a universal schema 
or principle that figures in a formal logic of induction, or at least in that portion of the logic 
that treats experiments? I will seek to establish here that a principle of replicability cannot 
be given a general formulation such as would allow it to serve in a formal logic of induction. 
Rather, successful inductive inferences associated with replicability should be understood as 
materially warranted. In barest form, I will argue that attempts to find such a general prin-
ciple collapse under the weight of mounting complexities arising from the multitude of con-
ditions and outcomes associated with replicability. We can, however, readily identify back-
ground facts that authorize the relevant inferences on a case-by-case basis, without the need 
for a universal principle. Once we have identified these facts, the search for a general principle 
becomes unnecessary, in so far as we are interested in finding the warrants of our inferences.
Before proceeding, we need a brief terminological digression: “repeatability,” “repro-
ducibility” and “replicability” are often used interchangeably. In some contexts, they have 
been given precise definitions. There, repeatability indicates as exact a replication of all 
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conditions as possible, including the same operators and apparatus; whereas reproducibil-
ity calls for changes of these conditions.2 I will use the terms replication and replicability to 
cover both notions. Most of the general analysis below applies equally to repeatability and 
reproducibility.
3. Failure of Formal Analysis
What kind of an inductive notion is replicability? If we wish to pursue a formal analy-
sis, is it possible to state it as a general principle? A good start is this:
Successful replication of an experiment is a good indicator of a veridical experimental outcome; 
failure of replication is a good indicator of a spurious experimental outcome.
This is far from a self-contained principle. Each term needs further explication. The more 
straightforward are the notions of veridical and spurious experimental outcomes:
A veridical experimental outcome is one that properly demonstrates the process or effect sought 
by the experimental design.
A spurious or artefactual experimental outcome fails to do so; it arises from an unintended dis-
ruption to the experimental design.
This is a rich enough characterization for us to proceed, even though many details are left 
open.
How close have we come to a universal inductive principle? Do we have an inductive 
analog of the universal, formal principles of deductive logic? We should bear in mind what 
the latter are like. One such universal deductive principle is the law of the excluded middle. 
It asserts:
For any proposition P, either P is true or P is false.
This deductive principle is a schema: we can insert any proposition we like for “P” and 
recover a truth, the application of the principle to that proposition. It is self-contained. 
2  In the narrower context of standardized measurement, the International Organization for Standardi-
zation has decreed (ISO 21748:2010(E), 3): “Repeatability conditions include: the same measurement 
procedure or test procedure; the same operator; the same measuring or test equipment used under the 
same condition; the same location; repetition over a short period of time. Reproducibility requires only 
that the measurement must reappear under changed conditions. That is, (ISO 21748:2010(E), 3): “re-
producibility conditions[:] observation conditions where independent test/measurement results are 
obtained with the same method on identical test/measurement items in different test or measurement 
facilities with different operators using different equipment[.]” Source: “Guidance for the use of re-
peatability, reproducibility and trueness estimates in measurement uncertainty estimates,” Publication 
ISO 21748: 2010(E). Similar definitions are found in National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
NIST Technical Note 1297 (1994), Definitions D.1.1.2 and D.1.1.3 and in the International Union of 
Pure and Applied Chemistry’s “Gold Book”: Compendium of Chemical Terminology, 2nd ed. Compiled 
by A. D. McNaught and A. Wilkinson. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford (1997).
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There are no tacit conditions limiting just which propositions can be substituted for “P”; 
and there is no ambiguity in what is meant by the truth or falsity attributed to the proposi-
tion (Or at least there are none beyond the usual evasions made by philosophers when they 
have to use these terms.)
It is quite different with the above characterization of replicability of experiment. The 
first difficulty is that the characterization includes many notions that require elaboration 
if the characterization is to rise to the level of precision of the law of the excluded middle. 
Just what is “a process or effect sought by the experimental design”? Just when is a second 
experiment replicating an earlier experiment as opposed to being a different experiment 
that looks similar to it? Elaborating these and similar questions is likely to be tedious and 
unlikely ever to yield a formulation that can stand without the need of further elucidation.
The second difficulty is more serious. The characterization employs inductive notions 
whose explication is unlikely to be achievable by formal means. It speaks of “good indicators.” 
This is an inherently vague notion. In the case of a single successful or failed replication, the 
strength of the indication can vary over a wide range. Presumably there is some idea that mul-
tiple, successful replications are better than just one. How much better are they? Is there a 
point of diminishing returns? When there are some successes of replication and some failures, 
how do we trade them off to come to our final assessment? Somehow the formal analysis will 
need to specify in general, abstract terms how all this accountancy is to be effected.
Finally the most serious problem facing a formal analysis of replicability is that the 
principle appears to be defeasible in every way possible. That is, there are cases of success-
ful replication in which the replication is judged to be a strong indicator of a veridical out-
come; and cases in which the success is judged epistemically inert. In the reverse direction, 
there are cases of failure of replication that are judged to be a strong indicator of a spurious 
outcome; and cases in which the failure is judged epistemically inert. Thus a full statement 
of the principle must provide independent criteria for when it applies or when it does not. 
Without such independent criteria, it becomes the sad specter of the principle that applies 
except when it does not.
Looking ahead, most of this chapter will be devoted to displaying examples in which 
all these combinations of success and failure are realized. The examples to be developed are 
listed in the table:
Table 1. Illustrations of all combinations of success and failure of replicability
Import of replicability upheld Import of replicability discarded
Successful replication H. Pylori Stomach Ulcers
(result accepted as veridical)
Intercessionary prayer
(result rejected as spurious)
Failed replication Cold fusion
(result rejected as spurious; and 
skeptics discount cases of successful 
replication)
Miller experiment contradicts rela-
tivity theory
(relativity theory upheld)
The “import of replicability” refers to the standard reading: successful replication indicates 
a veridical outcome; failure of replication indicates a spurious outcome. In the cases in the 
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first column, the import of replicability is upheld as expected; in those of the second, it is 
discarded.
These three difficulties present formidable challenges to formulating a precise principle 
of replicability: it must be complete enough not to need further explication of its central 
terms; it must replace the vague inductive term “good indicator” with something that al-
lows precise accountancy for multiple successes and failure; and it must define independent 
conditions of applicability flexibly enough accommodate the full range of cases in which 
replication or its failure is taken to be epistemically significant or epistemically inert.
4. A Material Analysis
While a formal account of replicability faces formidable obstacles, a material analysis will 
prove to have little trouble passing these same obstacles. The hard question of whether suc-
cessful replication or its failure is epistemically significant or inert is answered on a case-by-
case basis. The inductive import of each outcome is determined by the particular facts ob-
taining in the background of each case. They warrant the inductive arguments that proceed 
from those outcomes.
Ultimately, each case is unique and requires its own detailed analysis. However, at a 
more superficial level, it is possible to identify two general classes of background facts that 
serve to license the different inferences associated with replicability in each case. These facts 
are not narrowly associated just with replicability. Rather they are facts that warrant the in-
ference from the observed experimental outcome to the process or effect sought by the ex-
perimental design. Or, if they take an inhospitable form, they may warrant an inference 
from the observed outcome to the conclusion that it is spurious. These facts are:
A. Experimental conditions: these background facts specify conditions under which 
the effect or process of interest will manifest in a veridical experimental outcome.3
B. Confounding conditions: these background facts specify the conditions conducive 
to spurious experimental outcomes. These conditions simulate a veridical experi-
mental outcome, when the sought effect or process is not present; or they may in-
terfere sufficiently to produce an unsuccessful outcome, when the effect or process 
is present.
A familiar illustration of facts of type A and B arises in randomized controlled trials. We 
wish to determine if some treatment—a new drug, for example—is efficacious. We ran-
domly assign subjects to a test and a control group, both blinded. The test group is given 
the treatment and the control group is given a placebo. If the outcome is a statistically sig-
nificant, beneficial difference between the test and control group, we infer from it to the ef-
ficacy of the treatment.
The inductive inference to this conclusion is warranted by appropriate facts in class A 
and B. In class A is the key fact is that test subjects but not control subjects are given the 
treatment, so a beneficial difference between them can be due to the treatment. Implicit 
in this fact is another that is not commonly made explicit: that there is at least some pos-
3  This is sometimes called “construct validity.”
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sibility that treatment can bring about the effect. While this sort of fact is not one that 
we commonly call into question, it can be crucial. Critics of homeopathy (such as me) 
will refuse to accept that a controlled trial of a homeopathic remedy can demonstrate the 
remedy’s efficacy, for the remedy contains no active ingredients. Similarly, we shall see be-
low that skeptics of the healing efficacy of prayer find the corresponding sort of fact to be 
missing.
In class B, we require the facts that preclude a spurious outcome. Randomization is im-
portant here, for it assures us that the only systematic difference between the test and con-
trol group is the administering of the treatment, so that any ensuing difference between 
them can only be due to the treatment. Blinding is also important, so that the subjects and 
the result collecting experimenters do not know who is in the test or the control group. For 
otherwise, a statistically significant difference between the two groups might result from 
this knowledge itself, through the placebo effect or through the expectations of the experi-
menters recording results.
In short, the facts in class A warrant the inference to the conclusion that the efficacy of 
the treatment can be responsible for a positive outcome. The facts in class B warrant the in-
ference to the conclusion that another factor cannot be responsible for a positive outcome. 
We combine the two to conclude that the efficacy of the treatment is responsible for a pos-
itive outcome.
Now let us return to replicability. With any experiment, we can be uncertain whether 
appropriate facts in classes A and B prevail. Successful replication does not test all of them. 
Rather it tests whether certain unfavorable confounding conditions of class B are present. 
If we get the same positive outcome when a different operator performs the experiment, 
then we know that the first positive outcome was not due (solely) to some infelicity associ-
ated with the first operator. By systematically replicating the experiment with different op-
erators, different standards, different materials, different laboratories, and so on, we elimi-
nate the possibility of confounding conditions associated with each of the factors listed. If 
we test for repeatability in the technical sense—that is we replicate the experiment with all 
these factors unchanged—we are testing whether some random error in the execution of 
one experiment might be responsible for a spurious outcome.
This seems so straightforward, how is it that we find prominent cases in which the nor-
mal import of replicability is denied? The reason is that this import involves the complete 
inference from the observed outcome to the sought effect or process. That requires facts in 
both classes A and B to support the inference. In some of the disputed cases discussed be-
low, however, we find that the denial of the import of replicability results from a presump-
tion of failure of facts in class A, which are not directly tested by replication. In one, how-
ever, we will find disagreement over whether confounding conditions of class B have been 
appropriately arranged.
In the following sections, we will see the four cases of Table 1 elaborated. In the case of 
intercessionary prayer, we shall see successful replication of experiments judged by skeptics 
to be insufficient to establish the process sought. Their reason is that they do not find the 
requisite facts of class A do not obtain. In the case of cold fusion, we shall see that estab-
lishment skeptics and dissident supporters of cold fusion differ on the import of the mixed 
record of successful and failed replication. Their differences are traceable to differences of 
opinion on which facts in class A obtain. In the Miller relativity experiments, however, fail-
ure to reproduce an earlier experiment is judged not to impugn the earlier result, since its 
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supporters became convinced that Miller had not eliminated confounding effects covered 
by facts in class B.
5. H. Pylori Stomach Ulcers: Successful Replication
In 2005, Barry Marshall and Robin Warren won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medi-
cine with the citation reading “for their discovery of the bacterium Helicobacter pylori and 
its role in gastritis and peptic ulcer disease.” Prior to their work, it had been assumed that 
stomach ulcers were caused by stress and spicy food. The idea that a bacterium may be in-
volved was discounted. The stomach is highly acidic and bacteria do not tolerate such envi-
ronments well.
By taking biopsies from 100 participant patients, as reported in their initial letter 
(Marshall and Warren, 1983), they were able to demonstrate an association between the 
presence of the bacterium Helicobacter pylori and gastritis and ulcers, with 100% associa-
tion for duodenal ulcers. The importance of replication even at this early stage became clear 
when they sought to publish a more complete account. Warren (2005, 301-302) recounts 
the decisive moment.
We sent our definitive paper to the Lancet in 1984 ([Marshall and Warren, 1984]). Although the 
editors wanted to publish, they were unable to find any reviewers who believed our findings. Our 
contact with Skirrow became crucial here. We told him of our trouble, and he had our work re-
peated in his laboratory, with similar results. He informed the Lancet and shortly afterwards they 
published our paper, unaltered.
Contrary to a persistent myth, the new work was assimilated and rapidly repeated. As part 
of an account debunking this myth, Atwood (2004) reported:
Within a couple of years of the original report, numerous groups searched for, and most found, 
the same organism. Bacteriologists were giddy over the discovery of a new species. By 1987—vir-
tually overnight, on the timescale of medical science—reports from all over the world, including 
Africa, the Soviet Union, China, Peru, and elsewhere, had confirmed the finding of this bacte-
rium in association with gastritis and, to a lesser extent, ulcers.
One replication was more of a media stunt than controlled science. To prove the association, 
Marshall drank a beaker of Helicobacter pylori and subsequently succumbed to gastritis.
This is a “text book” case of the proper functioning of replication and there is little 
in it to distinguish formal and material approaches. The earlier reluctance to accept Mar-
shall and Warren’s work is readily explained materially. As long as it was believed as a back-
ground fact that bacteria do not live well in the highly acid environment of the stomach, 
there are insufficient facts in the background to support for the facts in class A. Detection 
of bacteria can only be through some coincidental contamination. The successful infer-
ence from the presence of the H. Pylori bacteria to the conclusion that they cause gastri-
tis and ulcers required acceptance of a new fact in class A: that bacteria with the capacity to 
cause gastritis and ulcers can survive in the stomach. The rapid replication of the outcome 
in many laboratories affirmed the requisite fact of class B: that their presence is not due to 
some confounding effect peculiar to Marshall and Warren’s laboratory.
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6. Cold Fusion: Failed Replication
The episode of controlled fusion is traditionally presented as one in which an avenue of re-
search was closed because of failure of replication. At the most superficial level, that may be 
a correct description. However a closer look at the episode reveals something more compli-
cated than the application of some principle of reproducibility. There certainly were many 
failed attempts at replication reported. However there were also many successful replica-
tions also reported. This has lead to a bifurcation in the community into those who discard 
the idea of cold fusion (the establishment view) and those who continue to pursue it (a dis-
sident minority). No simple inductive principle concerning replicability of experiment can 
capture the inductive reasoning associated with this bifurcation. It derives essentially from 
differences in the background assumptions of the groups and talk of replication is really a 
gloss on more complicated inferences, as the material theory of induction indicates.
Traditional nuclear power generation derives from the fission—the splitting apart—
of radioactive Uranium or Plutonium atoms. This fission is distinct from the nuclear re-
actions that power stars like our sun. They are driven by fusion—the joining together—of 
atoms of hydrogen and other light elements to form heavier elements. In the process, pro-
digious quantities of energy are released. It has long been a goal of the nuclear power in-
dustry to adapt fusion reactions to power generation. Their present terrestrial use has been 
limited to the uncontrolled fusion in hydrogen bombs. The difficulty is that enormously 
high temperatures are needed to smash the hydrogen atoms together sufficiently energeti-
cally to ignite a fusion reaction. Materials at these high temperatures are difficult to control 
in a power station and practical, fusion-based nuclear power generation remains a distant 
dream.
In March 1989, chemists Martin Fleischmann and B. Stanley Pons announced in a 
press release from the University of Utah that they had carried out fusion reactions on a 
laboratory bench at ordinary temperatures. Their experiments did used a heavier isotope of 
hydrogen, deuterium, in the form of deuterium oxide, also called “heavy water.” They elec-
trolyzed the heavy water using palladium electrodes. Over a lengthy electrolysis, one of the 
palladium electrodes, the cathode, would become saturated with deuterium and, as a result, 
the individual deuterium atoms would be driven closely enough together to ignite a nu-
clear fusion reaction. At least, that is what they claimed had happened, on the basis of the 
large quantities of heat produced. These quantities were greater than could be recovered 
from chemical changes, they asserted. In one burst, the released heat had melted and vapor-
ized part of the electrode, destroying some of the equipment. Then, Steven Jones, working 
at nearby Brigham Young University, revealed that he had been working largely independ-
ently on a similar cold fusion project and had experimental results involving not the gener-
ation of heat, but neutrons, a familiar signature of nuclear reactions.
Whether the researchers succeeded in igniting fusion reactions remains debated. How-
ever there is no doubt that they ignited a scientific and popular frenzy. The principal trig-
ger was the possibility of a new process that would revolutionize the power generation 
industry. There was a scramble to replicate the cold fusion experiments in the US and in-
ternationally. Cold fusion, if affirmed, would be a scientific discovery of the highest order. 
That lofty pinnacle was overshadowed by the possibility of new technology for a major in-
dustry and its lucrative patent rights. These financial motivations lent an uncommon ur-
gency in what was otherwise the realm of arcane specialists. There were other tensions, 
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 229-248
 Replicability of Experiment 237
such as the professional rivalry of physicists and chemists. Here were physicists failing to 
tame nuclear fusion with enormous, expensive devices. Now some chemists succeed with a 
project plotted in one of their kitchens and funded personally. Then there was a soap-opera 
quality to the rivalry between the Fleischmann/Pons and Jones projects. They had planned 
to coordinate their communications, but the arrangements had misfired and Fleischmann 
and Pons took the unusual course of announcing their discovery through a press release 
without Jones’ knowledge.
Let us set all these complications aside and focus on the inductive inferences. While 
there was initially considerable confusion over the inductive import of the experiments, 
that confusion resolved within a year into two views and it has largely remained so bifur-
cated. The establishment response was that the experiments failed to demonstrate fusion 
on the lab bench and that only modest resources should be assigned to further research. 
The minority, dissident view was that a great discovery had been made and all efforts 
should be put into developing it.
We find a clear statement of establishment view in the November 1989 report of the 
Energy Research Advisory Board to the US Department of Energy (ERAB, 1989). It con-
cluded in its Executive Summary:
The Panel concludes that the experimental results on excess heat from calorimetric cells reported 
to date do not present convincing evidence that useful sources of energy will result from the phe-
nomena attributed to cold fusion. In addition, the Panel concludes that experiments reported to 
date do not present convincing evidence to associate the reported anomalous heat with a nuclear 
process.
The Board was reserved in its recommendation for action:
The Panel recommends against the establishment of special programs or research centers to de-
velop cold fusion. However, there remain unresolved issues which may have interesting implica-
tions. The Panel is, therefore, sympathetic toward modest support for carefully focused and coop-
erative experiments within the present funding system.
The dissident community continued its research and, in 2004, was successful in pressing 
the US Department of Energy to reopen its evaluation. The community supplied a docu-
ment, “New Physical Effects in Metal Deuterides,” that was subjected to peer review and 
discussion. It was found (DOE, 2004) that “…the conclusions reached by the reviewers to-
day are similar to those found in the 1989 review.” The bifurcation remained unbreached.
Both sides deferred to reproducibility as a guiding standard. The 1989 Advisory Board 
report (ERAB, 1989) commences its preamble by noting the failure of reliable replication:
Ordinarily, new scientific discoveries are claimed to be consistent and reproducible; as a result, if 
the experiments are not complicated, the discovery can usually be confirmed or disproved in a few 
months. The claims of cold fusion, however, are unusual in that even the strongest proponents of 
cold fusion assert that the experiments, for unknown reasons, are not consistent and reproducible 
at the present time.
However mere problems of reproducibility cannot be the principal basis for the solidly neg-
ative conclusions reached by the Advisory Board. For their report documents both success-
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ful and failed replications of the various types of experiments aimed at testing cold fusion. 
For example, in relation to experiments yielding excess heat, the report’s Table 2.1 lists five 
experiments that found excess heat and thirteen that did not. While the ratio of five to 
thirteen certainly favors the no-heat result, it is hardly sufficient to dismiss the effect, espe-
cially when its reality, if demonstrated, would be of great utility.
The deeper grounding for the negative report is laid out early in the report (6-8) when 
answers are offered to the rhetorical question “Then why the skepticism?” The first reason 
is developed only in a few sentences: many researchers have been unable to replicate the ex-
cess heat effect; and these calorimetric measurements are technically rather difficult. The 
two remaining reasons are developed in some detail and amount to conflicts between the 
particulars of the positive experiments and the accepted science of nuclear reactions.
The second reason was summarized as:
the discrepancy between the claims of heat production and the failure to observe commensurate 
levels of fusion products, which should be by far the most sensitive signatures of fusion.
The nuclear reactions proposed for cold fusion involve fusion of two deuterium atoms to 
produce other atoms. Various reactions were possible and they would yield tritium, iso-
topes of helium or other products. The quantities of these fusion products detected did not 
match the quantities of heat reported. It was as if one burns wood in a fire. From the heat 
generated, one can determine how much wood ash must fall through the grate. The posi-
tive experiments were not finding the right amounts of ash.
The most important discrepancy was in neutron production. The most likely fusion 
reactions would produce neutrons and in large quantities. The report noted:
The initial announcement by Pons and Fleischmann in March 1989 exhibited the discrepancy 
between heat and fusion products in sharp terms. Namely, the level of neutrons they claimed to 
observe was 109 times less than that required if their stated heat output were due to fusion.
This discrepancy was noted very early by critics and, by itself, was deemed sufficient for in-
stant dismissal of the claims of cold fusion. Here is how one popular narrative from 1989 
reported the problem (Peat, 1989, 82)
According to Robert L. McCrory of the University of Rochester’s Laboratory of Laser Energet-
ics, for example, if nuclear fusion was really taking place, then the only way to make sense of all 
that heat was to have a trillion neutrons being emitted each second—enough to kill everyone in 
the room.
By now the following joke had begun to circulate around the world’s laboratories:
— FIRST SCIENTIST: Have you heard about the dead-graduate-student problem?
— SECOND SCIENTIST: No, what’s that.
— FIRST SCIENTIST: There are no dead graduate students.
The third reason was summarized as “cold fusion should not be possible based on estab-
lished theory.” Deuterium does not undergo fusion reactions under normal conditions be-
cause the electrostatic repulsion of the nuclei prevent its atoms approaching closer than 
about 0.1 nanometers, which is too great a separation for a nuclear reaction to start. The 
hope of the cold fusion researchers was that a palladium electrode could be so densely laden 
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with deuterium that sufficiently close approaches would occur. The report, however, dis-
puted these hopes. The closest approach of deuterium atoms in palladium is just 0.17 na-
nometers. That is over twice the distance (0.074 nanometers) separating two deuterium 
atoms in molecular deuterium, D2. The cold fusion researchers would be bringing the deu-
terium atoms closer if they merely left them in the form of free molecular deuterium.
Supporters of cold fusion also defer to the idea of reproducibility. Sturms (2007, 49) 
initiated the discussion of the challenges to cold fusion with the resounding affirmation:
Replication is the gold standard of reality. If enough people are able to make an effect work, the 
consensus of science and the general public accept the effect as being real and not error or figment 
of imagination.
He affirmed that replication has been successful:
A Myth has formed about cold fusion not being duplicated, being based on error, and being an 
example of “pathological science”, […] i.e. wishful thinking. None of this description is correct. 
The basic claims have been duplicated hundreds of times and continue to be duplicated by labo-
ratories all over the world, although success is difficult to achieve.
However he also allowed that the replication has not been uniformly successful (117):
Replication occurs when other people observe the same effects using essentially the same condi-
tions. Unfortunately, in the case of cold fusion, the required conditions are not known. Occa-
sionally, when a lucky combination of conditions has been created, the effects are observed. These 
effects have been seen many times, as the results listed throughout the book demonstrate, but not 
always on command. This failure of the effects to occur every time they are sought has become a 
major issue for the field and needs to be examined in detail because some confusion exists about 
what replication actually means.
The record of successful replication was reinforced with massive tables listing many suc-
cesses. The table listing experiments that report successful “anomalous power” production 
spans nearly ten pages (52-61).
Sturms came to very different conclusions than the Advisory Board concerning cold 
fusion. He regarded cold fusion as established fact to be announced with text-book like cer-
tainty (190):
The phenomenon of cold fusion or low energy nuclear reaction occurs in an unusual solid or even 
within complex organic molecules. A variety of nuclear reactions are initiated, depending on the 
atoms present. Some of these reactions occur at a rate sufficient to make measurable heat. The 
most active reaction produces 4He when deuterium is present. Other reactions occur at lesser 
rates, but rapidly enough to accumulate detectable nuclear products.
Where the Advisory Board report found the existing theory of nuclear fusion secure and 
unfavorable to cold fusion, Sturms inverted the relation and impugned the theory for its 
failure to accommodate experiment.
His treatment of neutron emissions illustrates this inversion. Standard nuclear phys-
ics allows for deuterium to fuse in several ways. The most probable reactions yield high 
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neutron and proton emissions. The reaction favored by cold fusion supporters was the fus-
ing of two deuterium atoms to yield a 4He atom, for that reaction involved only gamma 
ray emission, but no neutrons. The difficulty is that the neutron free reaction is weaker by 
a ratio of 107 in cross-section than the other reactions. Somehow the novel environment 
of the cold fusion experiment would need to bring about a great enhancement of this reac-
tion. This, the Advisory Board, found to be a fatal problem (ERAB, 1989, Sect. B.2):
We know of no way whereby the atomic or chemical environment can effect such an enhance-
ment, as this ratio is set by nuclear phenomena and is on a length scale some 104 times smaller 
than the atomic scale.
The point is mildly stated, but the idea is powerful. Fusion reactions involving deuterium 
had been well researched and well understood. Proponents of cold fusion had to argue that 
this established theory fails for some as yet unknown reason when the fusion reaction oc-
curs within a palladium electrode. Effects of this type were otherwise unknown and im-
plausible because fusion requires a closeness of approach of the deuterium atoms at which 
scales the palladium atoms are distant spectators.
Sturms (2007, 13) took a different view:4
If theory and observation are in conflict, theory wins [in the skeptics view]. In this case, the ab-
sence of neutrons proved that the effect does not occur even when tritium and extra heat are 
measured, because theory requires neutrons be produced. In their minds, the extra heat must be 
a measurement error and the tritium must be contamination. Evidence to the contrary was sim-
ply ignored. This is how faith-based science operates, but not the kind of science we are taught to 
respect. On the other hand, reality-based science acknowledges what nature reveals and then at-
tempts to find an explanation. Rejection occurs only if a satisfactory explanation cannot be dem-
onstrated. This demonstration is still in progress for cold fusion.
In sum, the real basis of the varying appraisals of cold fusion lay in inductive inferences 
grounded by background facts of class A. These facts specified the conditions under which 
cold fusion would manifest experimentally. In the establishment view, these facts called for 
rates of neutron and other fusion production not reported in the experiments; and, in ad-
dition, these facts denied that deuterium saturated electrodes could bring the deuterium 
atoms close enough to ignite fusion in the first place. Hence these facts warranted the in-
ference to the conclusion that the experiments had failed. The dissidents, however, were 
willing to conjecture looser background theories, including some undeveloped or even un-
known theories that would warrant the inference from the experimental results to cold fu-
sion. Both deferred to the idea of reproducibility. Yet, with the same record of experiment, 
they came to different conclusions.
My proposal is that they are not calling upon a universal principle of reproducibility 
that resides within some abstracted, logic of induction. Rather, the idea of reproducibility is 
merely a gloss on inferences that are quite specific to the case at hand and dependent essen-
4  I have not found an establishment response to this argument, but it is not too hard to imagine its con-
tent: the establishment view is not rejecting evidence, but considering a larger class that includes the ex-
periments and observations in other arenas that support the standard theory of fusion reactions.
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tially on background assumptions. It is exactly because the two groups differ in their back-
ground assumptions that they can come to judge different inferences warranted.5
7. The Miller Experiment: Failed Replication with no Inductive Import
How are we to deal with a case in which there are multiple successful replications of an ex-
periment, but a prominent, well-executed failure? Understood as a formal principle, repro-
ducibility gives us no real guidance. It cannot authorize us simply to dismiss the one failure 
of replication as inductively inert. Or at least it cannot do so without extensive elabora-
tion on just what conditions distinguish those cases in which the failure carries import and 
those in which it does not. Such elaborations are not at hand and not likely to be forthcom-
ing.
A material analysis of cases like this, however, faces no such general problems. For ap-
proached materially, there is no universal principle implemented. There are only particular 
cases, each of which is ultimately to be analyzed individually.
Here is a celebrated example. Nineteenth century electrodynamics had given center 
stage to the ether, the medium that carries light and electric and magnetic fields. It sur-
rounds the earth and the earth’s motion through it creates currents that blow past us, much 
as a car’s motion creates a headwind. Famously, the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 
had failed to detect this ether wind. The experiment employed an extremely sensitive inter-
ferometer that split a light beam into two folded pathways and then recombined the beams. 
The results were read from changes in the interference patterns formed by the recombined 
beams as the interferometer was slowly rotated. While its importance in Einstein’s pathway 
to special relativity remains debated (see Norton, 2014a), the null result of the experiment 
is foundational for special relativity. Had this experiment detected an ether wind or ether 
drift, it would have detected the absolute motion of the earth, in contradiction with the 
principle of relativity.
On December 29, 1925, Dayton C. Miller (1926), addressed the American Physical 
Society in Kansas City. He recounted his own efforts to replicate the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, and reported the results of his latest efforts of 1925, when his apparatus was 
set up on Mount Wilson near the Observatory in California. He had found a positive re-
sult of 10 km/sec for the ether drift. It was less than the 30 km/sec or so that might other-
wise be expected from the motion of the earth. Yet it was not a null result. This replication 
of the Michelson-Morley experiment had failed.
This was not a failure to be taken lightly. Now, over a hundred years after the discovery 
of special relativity, we classify experiments challenging special relativity with circle squar-
ing and perpetual motion machines. That dismissal was not so easy in 1926, especially in 
light of who Dayton C. Miller was. He was then the President of the American Physical 
Society; and he was employed by the Case School of Science, in Cleveland, the site of the 
5  According to the material theory, that does not mean that both inferences are sound. The situation 
is little different from the corresponding case of deductive logic. If two scientists employ the same 
premises but different deductive schema to arrive at contradictory conclusions, at least one of the 
schema is a fallacy. Correspondingly, if two scientists arrive at differing conclusions by inductive infer-
ence, at least one has a false warranting fact presumed.
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famous Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887. His experiments had a venerable lineage. 
In 1902 to 1904, he had collaborated on ether drift experiments with Michelson’s original 
collaborator, Edward Morley. They had reused parts of the apparatus of the original 1887 
experiment. These parts included the iron trough that held the mercury in which the inter-
ferometer floated and the original circular wooden float. These parts, Miller (1933, 209), 
noted with some pride of ownership in his later review, “have been continued in use by the 
writer to the present time.”
While there were other ether drift experiments from the time, Miller’s used one of the 
longest folded pathways for light, which would give his one of the greatest sensitivities.6 
The experiments of 1926 built on the experience with Miller’s earlier collaboration with 
Morley and successive refinements of the apparatus and experimental design through mul-
tiple experiments in a new series starting in 1921. It was feared, for example, that a base-
ment in Cleveland, a mere 300 feet above the level of Lake Erie, may be too shielded from 
the ether current. For this reason, the entire apparatus was relocated to a mountainside 
next to the Mount Wilson Observatory, at an elevation of about six thousand feet. Miller’s 
(1926, 1933) recounts the elaborate cautions undertaken to avoid and control all imagina-
ble sources of error.
The report of Miller’s positive result produced great interest in both scientific and pop-
ular circles. Miller was even awarded a $1,000 prize by the American Association for the 
Advancement for Science for a related article. Einstein soon succumbed to popular pressure 
to respond. He wrote a short note for the popular press, published January 26, 1926, in the 
Vossische Zeitung, a well-known liberal newspaper in Berlin.7 His remarks included:
There is, however, in my opinion practically no likelihood that Mr. Miller is right. [Einstein’s em-
phasis]. His results are irregular and point rather to an undiscovered source of error than to a sys-
tematic effect. Furthermore, Miller’s results are in and of themselves hardly credible, because they 
assume a strong dependence of the velocity of light upon the height above sea level. Finally a Ger-
man physicist (Tomaschek) recently performed an electrical experiment also at a considerable 
height above the sea (the Trouton-Noble experiment), the result of which speaks against Miller’s 
results insofar as it supports the absence of an “ether wind” at great altitudes.
From our perspective, what is notable about Einstein’s response is that it invokes no mat-
ters of general inductive principle. Had Miller’s claims somehow contravened an identifi-
able, universal inductive principle, it would have been easy for Einstein merely to point that 
out, much as one might identify a deductive fallacy. Rather, Einstein proceeds precisely as 
one would expect from the material theory. He gets the sharpest image of the inductive im-
port of Miller’s work by looking most narrowly at it.
Einstein’s critique draws on facts in classes A and B above. For example, he complained 
that Miller’s results are “irregular.” Einstein did not elaborate, but, presumably, his con-
cerns are similar to those expressed by Hans Thirring later in a June 1926 communication 
to Nature. In explaining his complete disagreement with Miller’s interpretation of the ex-
6  For a compendium of other ether drift experiments from that time, see Miller, 1933, 239-40 and 
Shankland et al., 1955, 168.
7  This article was found by Klaus Hetschel (1992) from whose paper the translation of the text is drawn. 
See Hetschel (1992) for more details of the scientific and popular reaction to Miller’s experiments.
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 229-248
 Replicability of Experiment 243
perimental results, Thirring (1926) noted several irregularities within Miller’s data. Since 
the ether wind will come from one direction in space, the direction detected by the inter-
ferometer should rotate through all points of the compass in the course of a day, as the daily 
rotation of the earth rotates the apparatus once per day in space. Yet, Thirring (82) found:
…an effect pointing towards the north-west quadrant of the compass in about ninety-five per 
cent. of all observations. This fact seems to be fatal to the assumption of an ether drift of constant 
direction towards a certain point of the heavens…
The facts at issue here are those in class A, which specify the conditions under which the 
process of interest manifests an experimental outcome. Under the supposition of an ether 
theory, the process of interest, the earth’s motion through the ether, would manifest as an 
ether wind of a definite direction in space. That was not found, so that these background 
facts could not license the inference from the experimental outcome to the ether current.
Einstein then conjectured an “an undiscovered source of error.” He did not specify 
what this source might be. However Einstein was quite direct in his private notes to corre-
spondents. He wrote to his friend and confidant, Michele Besso, on December 25, 1926:8 
“I think that the Miller experiments rest on an error in temperature. I have not taken them 
seriously for a minute.” He pressed this concern in a subsequent correspondence with 
Miller later in 1926, with Miller dismissing it by describing the elaborate corrections put it 
place to control temperature effects.9 Einstein’s doubts may have had a firmer foundation 
than the brevity of his Vossische Zeitung remarks suggest, for he had long taken a keen inter-
est in Miller’s experiment. During Einstein’s 1921 visit to the US, he had taken the trouble 
to visit Miller and, on Miller’s report, had spent over an hour and a half discussing the ether 
drift experiments.10 Einstein’s suspicions were affirmed when Shankland et al. (1955) later 
performed a painstaking re-analysis of Miller’s results, finding that positive results were as-
sociated with temperature variations in apparatus.
This second set of inferences drew on facts in class B. Einstein and Shankland and his 
colleagues had a sense of the processes that could produce a confounding result and, as 
Shankland and his colleagues affirmed, the pattern of results, in conjunction with these 
facts supported the conclusion of the thermal original of Miller’s results.
8. Intercessionary Prayer: Successful Replication with No Inductive Import
The converse case is also possible: the successful replication of experiments, yet those suc-
cesses are nonetheless regarded as inductively inert. Once again no formal account of re-
producibility of experiment can accommodate this unless it specifies the conditions under 
 8  As quoted in Holton (1969, 185-86).
 9  For details, see Hentschel (1992, 608). Einstein noted that temperature changes of as little as 1/10th 
degree in the air of the light path would be sufficient to generate results of the magnitude of Miller’s. 
I am grateful to a referee for pointing out that similar concerns were expressed by Michelson (1881, 
125) himself decades earlier. Michelson showed that temperature differences as little as one hundredth 
of a degree would be sufficient to confound his experiment.
10  As affirmed by a letter of Miller’s quoted in Holton (1969, 186).
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which successful replication does and does not have inductive import. Approached mate-
rially, each case is treated individually and we face no insurmountable problems of general 
principle.
In intercessionary prayer, one entreats a deity or supernatural power to intervene in 
mundane affairs. The entreaty is most commonly for well-being and health and especially 
the speedy recovery of the sick. In the nineteenth century, two leading scientists, John Tyn-
dall and Francis Galton, proposed that the efficacy of prayer could be assessed by objective 
tests of the type routinely employed in science.11 If the sick do indeed fare better when they 
are prayed for, that good effect ought to be discernible through simple statistical analysis. 
They were skeptical. Galton had been collecting data for what amounted to a rather fragile 
retrospective study. He displayed a table of the mean lifetimes of males who survived past 
30 years. Recalling that sovereigns in every state are the subjects of public prayer, such as 
“Grant her in health long to live,” he observed of his table (Galton, 1872):
The sovereigns are literally the shortest lived of all who have the advantage of affluence. The 
prayer has therefore no efficacy, unless the very questionable hypothesis be raised, that the condi-
tions of royal life may naturally be yet more fatal, and that their influence is partly, though incom-
pletely, neutralized by the effects of public prayers.:
The proposal evoked derision in theological circles. James M’Cosh (1872, 777-778) re-
torted
We laugh at Rousseau’s method of settling the question of the existence of God: he was to pray 
and then throw a stone at a tree, and decide in the affirmative or negative, according as it did or 
did not strike the object. The experiment projected by Professor Tyndall’s friend is scarcely less 
irrational.
The mood had changed by the later twentieth century. Controlled studies of intecessionary 
prayer were conducted and continue to be conducted. Randolph Byrd (1988), for exam-
ple, reported a prospective  randomized double-blind trial of the effects of intercessionary 
prayer on the recovery of patients in a coronary care unit. He reported statistically signifi-
cant improvements in recovery among those in the test group receiving prayer. Harris et al. 
(1999) performed a similar study on cardiac patients, again finding prayer to be associated 
with improvements in recovery. While not all experimental tests of intercessionary prayer 
have produced positive results, there are sufficient for meta-level surveys to be written. As-
tin et al. (2000) report the two studies above as the only ones producing positive results 
among the five surveyed. However, in the broader category of “distant healing,” 57% of the 
studies reported positive results, which supported the final conclusion that the field “mer-
its further study.” A later review (Roberts et al., 2009)12 was less optimistic. They found the 
results among the ten trials surveyed to be equivocal and recommended against further in-
vestigation.
11  For a brief history, see Brush (1974).
12  Curiously, this report included positive results from the spoof Leibovici (2001) study. It also noted a 
later critic who pointed out their error, but nonetheless did not disavow the study, concluding: “The 
Leibovici 2001 was not in jest. It is a rather serious paper, intended as a challenge.” (56-57).
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Most of these reports are of little help understanding what grounds inductive inference 
in relation to the reproducibility of experiment. Both surveys grapple awkwardly with the 
problem of some successful and some failed replication and, from them, arrive abruptly at a 
synoptic judgment. We are given little insight into how the analysts balanced the compet-
ing inductive import of the successes and failure to arise.
There is a subgroup, however, whose members make clear that they regard successful 
replication of the intercessionary prayer experiments as inductively inert, for they do not 
believe that these studies have any inductive powers at all. Their analysis conforms with the 
material approach to reproducibility. For successful replication requires the facts in classes 
A and B above to be hospitable. This skeptical group does not find facts in class A sup-
porting an inference from the experimental outcome to the supernatural intervention pro-
posed. Hence replication adds nothing to an outcome that was already inductively inert.
This group includes atheist polemicists like Richard Dawkins. He remarks in his God 
Delusion (86) that “the very idea of doing such experiments is open to a generous meas-
ure of ridicule…” Theists also have traditionally been skeptical of such experiments. Their 
analyses can be more measured and thus prove more illuminating. The three authors of 
Chibnall et al. (2001), a Catholic, a Protestant and a Jew, describe how they set out to per-
form an experimental test of distant prayer. They “became convinced that the very idea of 
testing distant prayer scientifically was fundamentally unsound.” In a telling, detailed anal-
ysis, they argue powerfully that, in effect, the requisite facts of the class A do not obtain: we 
have no good reason to expect the effect or process of interest (supernatural intervention) 
to be manifested in the experimental outcome (statistics of recovery rates among patients). 
They ask:
If prayer is a metaphysical concept linked to a supernatural being or force, why would its effi-
cacy vary according to parameters such as frequency, duration, type, or form? The very concept of 
prayer exists only in the context of human intercourse with the transcendent, not in nature. The 
epistemology that governs prayer (and all matters of faith) is separate from that which governs na-
ture. Why, then, attempt to explicate it as if it were a controllable, natural phenomenon?
… there is no reasonable theoretical construct to which to link prayer because of, we would ar-
gue, its very nature. No model guides our understanding of intercessory prayer as a treatment 
in the way we know that drug pharmacokinetics, type, dose, schedule, interactions, and treat-
ment length are critical to an antibiotic as a treatment. In fact, we believe no scientific model 
can guide it.
Perhaps one of the most revealing of all the intercessionary prayer studies was reported in 
the December 2001 issue of the British Medical Journal. Leibovici (2001) collected all re-
ports of patients who were detected with blood infections in a university hospital in Israel 
(Rabin Medical Center, Beilinson Campus) in 1990-1996. In 2000, he randomized the 
cases and arranged for prayer for a test group. The results show no improvement in mortal-
ity among the test group but a statistically significant shortening of both hospital stay and 
fever duration. The results were “retrospective” in the sense that these outcomes had al-
ready happened at the time the prayers were administered. It was suggested that we should 
not assume that “God is limited by a linear time, as we are.”13
13  I learned of this bizarre paper from a talk by John Worrall.
246 John D. Norton
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 229-248
This peculiar report produced the uproar one might expect. Letters to the editor in the 
April 27, 2002, issue of the British Medical Journal covered a wide range of complaints; and 
it was at times hard to tell if they were written in the same spirit at the original article. They 
included a defense of the laws of physics against breakage and protests over the ethics of ex-
perimenting on subjects whose consent could no longer be secured at the time of the exper-
iment. The letters were concluded with an “Author’s Reply,” in which Leibovici admitted 
that the paper was really a spoof, but with a deeper purpose:14
The purpose of the article was to ask the following question: Would you believe in a study that 
looks methodologically correct but tests something that is completely out of people’s frame (or 
model) of the physical world—for example, retroactive intervention or badly distilled water for 
asthma?
Of three possible answers, Leibovici endorsed the third:
To deny from the beginning that empirical methods can be applied to questions that are com-
pletely outside the scientific model of the world. Or in a more formal way, if the pre-trial proba-
bility is infinitesimally low, the results of the trial will not really change it, and the trial should not 
be performed. This, to my mind, turns the article into a non-study, although the details provided 
in the publication (randomization done only once, statement of a wish, analysis, etc) are correct.
Leibovici’s assessment expresses in miniature why a formal account of controlled trials 
fails, where a material account succeeds. He notes that one can have a trial that meets all 
the requisite formal conditions. That was how he set up the study his article. Nonetheless 
the study has no inductive import. This situation is inexplicable if one adheres to a general, 
formal account of the reproducibility of experiment. The material approach faces no such 
problems. In it, the trial can have inductive import only if requisite background facts are 
hospitable. This, Leibovici asserts, is not the case here.
9. Conclusion
What is the inductive import of a successful or failed replication of an experiment? Mostly, 
successful replication is favorable to the result sought; and failures to replicate are unfavora-
ble. However this is true “mostly” only. This broad similarity across many cases supports the 
illusion that there is some general inductive principle concerning replication at work. How-
ever, efforts to specify that general principle precisely lead to mounting difficulties and failure.
Rather, as the material theory of induction requires, the question is ultimately an-
swered differently in different cases according to the background facts obtaining. The more 
14  Fact can be stranger that fiction. Over a year after the scam was admitted, Olshanky and Dossey 
(2003) published a note in the same journal that dismissed Leibovici’s disavowal. In a narrative laden 
with pleas for open-minds, Einstein, Stephen Hawking, quantum mechanics, string theory and con-
sciousness, they urged that we should subject these non-local, anomalous effects to serious study. This 
paper gives me great confidence in humanities’ ability to turn every stone, for clearly no idea, no mat-
ter how absurd, lacks proponents.
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we narrow the types of experiments considered, the more precise the answers become. This 
is what we would expect from a material approach to induction, since with this narrowing 
the variability in background facts is reduced. What appeared as a universal principle is re-
ally only a resemblance among many distinct inductive inferences that vary in details ac-
cording to their domains. No universal principle of inductive logic provides a warrant for 
these individual inferences. They are warranted by the particular facts prevailing in each 
domain.
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